Energy & Power

Non-household users will face tighter access as the government prioritises household and transport fuels and applies demand-management measures. Export controls and intensified inspections now restrict shipments and increase supply monitoring.

The Ministry of Heavy Industries extended e2w subsidies through July 31, 2026 and raised the e2w sales target to 2.48 million. That preserves subsidized purchase support but requires faster deployment by manufacturers and programme managers to meet the larger target. Funding for e-rickshaws and e-carts was cut from ₹192 crore to ₹50 crore and their subsidy window extended to March 31, 2028, restricting scale-up in those categories.

The government will block gasoline shipments abroad from April 1 through July 31, preventing exporters from selling Russian gasoline overseas. This restriction limits foreign buyers' access to Russian gasoline and forces importers to secure alternative suppliers. The measure prioritizes domestic supply and reduces export volumes while in force.

The scheme now restricts eligibility by setting ex-factory price caps (two‑wheelers ≤ Rs 1.5 lakh; three‑wheelers ≤ Rs 2.5 lakh) and registration cutoffs. Two‑wheelers must be registered by July 31, 2026 and three‑wheelers by March 31, 2028. Because the Rs 10,900 crore fund and fixed volume caps are binding, incentives will stop once funds or subcomponent targets are exhausted, making subsidy availability uncertain and accelerating registration timelines.

The government suspended the Rule 144(xi) registration requirement for bidders from countries sharing land borders for 21 listed inputs, removing the prior eligibility barrier. That change permits foreign suppliers, including Chinese firms, to bid directly for those BHEL contracts and reduces procurement restrictions on sourcing specialized materials domestically. The relaxation therefore tightens no new domestic-preference constraint and raises competitive pressure on local suppliers for these items.

Iran now limits commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz to vessels from designated 'friendly' states, including India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Iraq. Vessels from the U.S., Israel and some Gulf states are excluded, effectively blocking their passage. The restriction narrows available shipping access and keeps overall tanker traffic through the strait drastically reduced.

The reduction lowers the special additional excise on petrol and scraps the diesel levy, creating fiscal/headroom that oil marketing companies (OMCs) can use to absorb rising crude costs. This constrains the change to stabilising retail prices rather than delivering immediate consumer price cuts. Consequently, it is now harder for consumers to see near-term reductions at the pump even as crude remains elevated.

Exporters must pay Rs 21.5 per litre on diesel and Rs 29.5 per litre on ATF, adding a binding per‑unit cost to outbound shipments. That reduces refiners' export margins or forces higher export prices, making diesel and ATF exports less profitable and likely to slow.

City gas distributors must provision piped natural gas to residential schools, colleges, hostels and similar facilities within five days, subject to infrastructure feasibility. They must submit a connectivity compliance report after five days and then daily. This makes rapid last‑mile hookups and continuous reporting operationally mandatory, increasing deployment and reporting pressure on CGDs.

By passing on input-cost increases, Nayara requires its retail outlets to charge higher fuel rates, reducing their accumulated losses. This makes it harder for private retailers to sustain frozen prices and causes uneven effective hikes across states because local VAT alters the final increase.

The grant ties short-term UK industrial CO2 supply to a government-funded restart of the Ensus bioethanol plant, using CO2 as a by-product. This eases immediate shortages for sectors like drinks and nuclear but makes continued CO2 availability dependent on further government funding or commercial restart after the three-month window.

Iran asserts sovereign control over the Strait and has limited authorized passage to five named ‘friendly’ states, establishing state-managed access. This restricts open, routine navigation and makes third‑party commercial transit dependent on Tehran’s permission. Immediate consequence: international shipping through Hormuz remains constrained and faces increased legal and operational uncertainty.